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On the long and tortuous path to justice for the First
Nations of Canada, the case of Delgamuukw v. The Queen' is
likely to become one of the most important landmarks.
Whether the outcome of this ongoing litigation will represent a
step towards, or a sidetrack from, the achievement of a just
settlement for Aboriginal Peoples is now in the hands of the
Supreme Court. The case raises a number of issues of
immense consequence that were not addressed in the Supreme
Court's decision in Sparrow (1990)2 or that have been left
unresolved by the failure of attempts to amend the constitution
to explicitly recognize an inherent Aboriginal right of self-
government. Is Aboriginal title an "existing aboriginal right"
protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in those
parts of the country where Aboriginal lands have not been
ceded by treaty? Does the concept of Aboriginal rights entail a
right of self-government, and if so, was that right extinguished
prior to 1982?
THE TMAL JUDGMENT
The Delgamuukw case involves a claim brought by the
hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples to
ownership of and jurisdiction over 58,000 square kilometres
of territory in central British Columbia. The trial of this
momentous claim lasted 374 days from May 1987 to June
1990. The trial judgment of McEachern C.J., released in
March 1991, dismissed the claims to ownership and
jurisdiction. McEachern C.J. held that Aboriginal jurisdiction
or self-government was extinguished by the exercise of British
sovereignty over the mainland colony of British Columbia in
1858. He further held that Aboriginal title over unceded
territory throughout B.C. had been extinguished by colonial
enactments passed prior to 1871 which asserted Crown title
over all lands in B.C.. McEachern C.J. did issue a relatively
inconsequential order that, subject to the general law of the
province, the B.C. government has a continuing fiduciary duty
to permit the plaintiffs to use unoccupied or vacant Crown
land in the territory for Aboriginal sustenance purposes.
The breadth of McEachern C.J.'s reasoning meant that
the Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights of self-government
of B.C. First Nations were lost entirely over a century ago
and thus no longer qualify as "existing" rights protected by
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Given that these
rights were extinguished, in McEachern C.J.'s view, by the
simple exercise of British legislative sovereignty and by the
assertion of underlying Crown title in land, the implications of
his reasoning were dire for Aboriginal Peoples throughout the
country.'
THE oOo.C.Ao JUDGMENT
The appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal was
argued in 34 days of hearings from May to July 1992. The
newly elected N.D.P. government abandoned the argument -
made by the previous Social Credit administration and
accepted by the trial judge - that there had been a "blanket
extinguishment" of Aboriginal title in the colony prior to
1871. In its decision released in June 1993, the Court of
Appeal ruled unanimously in favour of the plaintiff in light of
the government's new position. The Court thus allowed the
appeal in part and issued a declaration that the plaintiffs' have
existing Aboriginal rights of occupation and use over much of
the claimed territory. The determination of the precise
boundaries of the lands subject to the plaintiffs' Aboriginal
title was left to negotiations.
In all other significant respects, the factual findings and
legal rulings of the trial judge were affirmed by a 3-2 majority
of the Court. The majority judgments of Macfarlane J.A.
(Taggart J.A. concurring) and Wallace J.A. found that the
trial judge had made no palpable or overriding errors in his
assessment of the evidence. They agreed with his conclusion
that any Aboriginal right held by the plaintiffs to exercise
jurisdiction over the territory or their people had been
extinguished by 1870. In separate dissents, Lambert J.A. and
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Hutcheon J.A. disagreed on this crucial point. In their view,
the plaintiffs' Aboriginal rights included a right of self-
government or self-regulation that had not been extinguished
by the assertion of either British or Canadian sovereignty.
A flBR A!_ MY'BiLEl AMID SELF-
(ROVfIRINMIEMYN AS COMMO G LAW
ABGOMI AL RIGHTS
The Supreme Court in Sparrow defined Aboriginal rights
as including customs or practices that constitute "an integral
part" of a "distinctive" Aboriginal culture. 4 This test was
applied by the judges of the B.C.C.A. in Delgamuukw.' While
Aboriginal title is a well-established component of the
common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights,6 the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the question of whether the doctrine
of Aboriginal rights entails a right of self-government. The
majority judges in Delgamuukw seemed to presume that it
does, although they did not find it necessary to directly
address the point given their conclusions on extinguishment, to
be discussed below. The dissenting judges did address the
point. Lambert J.A. found that "the aboriginal rights of self-
government and self-regulation," to the extent that they
"formed an integral part" of a "distinctive culture," are
recognized as part of the common law doctrine of Aboriginal
rights.7 Hutcheon J.A. reached a similar conclusion regarding
a more narrowly conceived "aboriginal right of self-
regulation."8 Indeed, once one accepts, as Macfarlane J.A.
did, that the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples had an
"organized society" at the time that British sovereignty was
asserted,9 the conclusion seems inescapable that a right of self-
government was an "integral part of their distinctive culture,"
and thus was incorporated in the common law doctrine of
Aboriginal rights.'0
7=HE 7Ef" FOR EXTI HrI$HMF [EN
The Supreme Court decision in Sparrow held that any
common law Aboriginal rights that were not extinguished
prior to 1982 are "existing" and thus "recognized and
affirmed" in a contemporary fashion by section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The Court made clear that extensive
and detailed regulation or impairment of a right does not
amount to extinguishment." Adopting the test put forward by
Hall J.A. in Calder (1973),2 the Court held that a right is
extinguished only when it is completely abrogated by a "clear
and plain" intention of the sovereign. 3 The Crown has the
burden of establishing these elements of extinguishment.
Neither the Aboriginal title nor the Aboriginal right of
self-government of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en peoples have
ever been explicitly extinguished. A question that arises,
therefore, is whether sovereign intent can ever be "clear and
plain" if not explicitly stated in legislation. All members of
the B.C.C.A. in Delgamuukw held that implicit legislative
extinguishment is possible. For example, Macfarlane J.A.
noted that the Supreme Court had not stated in Sparrow that
intent to extinguish must be expressly stated in legislation. It
followed, in his view, that a clear and plain sovereign
intention "may be declared expressly or manifested by
unavoidable implication." 4 Extinguishment by necessary
implication is possible only in those rare cases where "the
interpretation of the statute permits no other result.""'
This conclusion, allowing the possibility of
extinguishment by necessary legislative implication, is faithful
to the word of the Sparrow decision but, arguably, not to its
spirit. The strict test for extinguishment is an important
limitation on the orthodox and draconian view that prior to
1982 Aboriginal rights existed at "the pleasure of the
Crown." 6 The unilateral expropriation of Aboriginal rights
was an extraordinary possibility that was apparently available
to the colony of British Columbia prior to 1871 and to the
government of Canada from 1871 to 1982.
The legal basis for untrammelled British, and later
Canadian, sovereign authority over Aboriginal nations has
never been adequately explained. 7 Ultimately it rests on the
common law doctrine of discovery, or the notion that
sovereignty over an uninhabited territory vests in the
discovering or settling power. In applying this principle to
British North America, judges have managed to skirt the fact
that Aboriginal Peoples did indeed inhabit the territory. The
Delgamuukw decision continues a tradition that has woven this
ugly fiction into the fabric of our law. Wallace J.A., for
example, relied on decisions that limited the application of the
doctrine of discovery to "uninhabited" or "unoccupied"
territories, 8 yet he did not find it necessary to explain how the
principle could possibly be relevant to territories occupied by
the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en.
If Canadian courts are unwilling to question the validity of
the assertion of British or Canadian sovereignty over
Aboriginal societies, as it appears they are,"' then the principle
of extinguishment has an especially crucial role to play in
limiting the ability of contemporary Canadian governments to
argue that the actions of their predecessors amounted to
effective unilateral expropriation of Aboriginal interests. One
important role that the "clear and plain intention" test could
fulfil is the prevention of expropriation without at least some
notice to the persons most affected, namely, the holders of the
Aboriginal rights. Expropriation without notice is especially
offensive, because those persons detrimentally affected are not
informed of the change in their legal position and thus are
deprived of an opportunity to object to the taking without
consent.
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The "clear and plain intention" test is closely related to
the "honour of the Crown:" if the Crown has not explicitly
conveyed its intention to Aboriginal Peoples, how can it be
said that its intention is either honourable or "clear and
plain"? Clear and plain to whom? Surely it is not just the
subjective intention of non-Aboriginal authorities that ought to
be relevant. There ought to be a requirement that the intention
be made clear and plain in an objective or public sense,
particularly to Aboriginal persons whose knowledge and
awareness of the significance of European legal practices
cannot be presumed. These considerations suggest that a
stricter understanding of the requirement of "clear and plain
intention" than that adopted by the B.C.C.A. would be more
consistent with the twin goals of upholding the honour of the
Crown and promoting a just settlement for Aboriginal Peoples
that the Supreme Court has said should guide the inter-
pretation of section 35.12
I!EXTIUGLUIS I INT OF AISOIMM@IAL
The B.C.C.A. held unanimously that thirteen colonial
instruments passed between 1858 and 1870 did not manifest a
clear and plain sovereign intention to extinguish Aboriginal
title by necessary implication. These enactments asserted
Crown title over all lands in B.C. and empowered the
Governor to sell Crown lands in the colony. They made no
mention of Aboriginal interests in land. Macfarlane J.A. stated
that the purpose of these enactments was to facilitate
settlement, not to disregard Aboriginal interests nor to
foreclose the treaty process.2 The other judges all agreed that
the taking of underlying title by the Crown was not
inconsistent with a recognition of the burden constituted by
Aboriginal title.22
All of the judges agreed that after B.C. joined
Confederation in 1871, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 placed the extinguishment of Aboriginal title beyond
provincial legislative competence. 23 Nor had the federal
government passed any legislation extinguishing Aboriginal
title between 1871 and 1982.24 After 1982, extinguishment is
constitutionally prohibited because it would not meet the
justificatory standard set out by the Supreme Court in
Sparrow.' The judges noted that the ways in which Aboriginal
title and grants of fee simple and other property rights will co-
exist "cannot be decided in this case, and are ripe for
negotiation. "26
It followed, then, that Aboriginal title is an existing
Aboriginal right in British Columbia, now afforded
constitutional protection by section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The question of extinguishment that had divided the
Supreme Court 3-3 in the Calder case twenty years earlier has
finally been resolved. It seems highly unlikely that the present
Supreme Court will disagree with the persuasive reasoning of
the B.C.C.A. on this point, especially in light of the B.C.
(and federal) government's demonstrated willingness to begin
negotiations on settling the land claims covering most of the
province.
I!EKTMGUMMVS [ENT' OF ABOMMMBAL
$IELF-GOVIERN M IIEMT
A 3-2 majority of the B.C.C.A. found that any Aboriginal
right of the plaintiffs' to exercise legislative jurisdiction over
their lands and peoples had been extinguished by either the
acquisition or exercise of sovereignty over the mainland
colony in 1846 and 1858 respectively, or, in the alternative,
by the entry of B.C. into Confederation in 1871. In
Macfarlane J.A.'s judgment, "any vestige of aboriginal law-
making competence was superseded" on "the date that the
legislative power of the Sovereign was imposed."2 7 He agreed
with the trial judge that this likely occurred in 1858 when the
mainland colony was established and the governor was
empowered by imperial legislation to make all laws necessary
for the good governance of the colony. If he was mistaken
with respect to colonial extinguishment, Macfarlane J.A. was
of the opinion that continuing Aboriginal rights of self-
government were "inconsistent with the division of powers
found in the Constitution Act, 1867 and introduced into British
Columbia in 1871. Sections 91 and 92 of that Act exhaustively
distribute legislative power in Canada ... The division of
governmental powers between Canada and the Provinces left
no room for a third order of government."28
Wallace J.A. fixed the moment of extinguishment of
Aboriginal self-government in B.C. at an earlier date, namely
the acquisition of sovereignty by the British over the territory
in 1846 pursuant to the Oregon Boundary Treaty. At that
point, "supreme legal authority vested with the British
Crown" and "the Indians became subjects of the Crown and
the common law applied throughout the territory and to all
inhabitants."29 Like Macfarlane J.A., Wallace J.A. was of the
view that, in the event that any rights of self-government
survived the colonial period, they were eliminated by the
exhaustive distribution of legislative power between Parliament
and the provincial legislature that came into force in 1871 .
The reasoning of the majority judgments is open to
challenge on a number of fronts. For one, Macfarlane and
Wallace JJ. failed to apply the clear and plain intention test
for extinguishment to this issue. Indeed, they did not discuss
the test for extinguishment until later in their reasons, as if
somehow it was not relevant to the question of whether an
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Aboriginal right of self-government continues to exist. If they
had applied the test they developed, they would have found
extinguishment of an Aboriginal right of self-government only
if there was no other possible interpretation of the
consequences of the assertion of British and Canadian
sovereignty.
Secondly, both judges cited Dicey in support of the
absolute supremacy of the British Parliament. 3 Wallace J.A.,
after quoting Dicey, asserted that the claim of Aboriginal
jurisdiction "is incompatible with every principle of the
parliamentary sovereignty which vested in the Imperial
Parliament in 1846."32 Yet, accepting the authority of Dicey's
views regarding the domestic powers of the British parliament,
they do not necessarily hold when applied to an unconquered,
unsurrendered territory occupied by indigenous nations. The
British principle of parliamentary supremacy is not, and never
has been, an absolute in the Canadian context.33 It has had to
yield, for example, to Canadian constitutional realities such as
the division of powers in a federal state and the entrenchment
of guaranteed rights in constitutional documents. A possible
interpretation of the assertion of British sovereignty over B.C.
is that the principle of parliamentary supremacy had to yield
to accommodate the presence of self-governing indigenous
societies, just as it has had to yield to other Canadian
realities.'
Similarly, as Rand J. stated in 1958, the principle of
exhaustiveness is "subject always to the express or necessarily
implied limitations of the [1867] Act itself. "M The question,
then, is whether the presence of self-governing Aboriginal
nations in Canada is a "necessarily implied limitation" on the
powers of provincial and federal governments, 36 a question
that is avoided by treating the exhaustiveness principle as an
absolute. It is worth noting that in past judicial decisions, the
principle of exhaustiveness has been put to the service of the
federal ideal of co-ordinate and equal sovereign authorities.
37
In this sense, it is troubling to see the principle employed to
maintain and justify a distinctly non-federal, colonial
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
governments.
Nevertheless, even if we accept that Aboriginal
sovereignty could be extinguished without consent prior to
1982, and that it was in fact so displaced by the assertion or
exercise of colonial sovereignty, or by the coming into force
of the Constitution Act, 1867, it does not follow that the
Aboriginal right of self-government has ceased to exist for the
purposes of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The
Dicey theory of parliamentary supremacy and its federal
derivative, the principle of exhaustiveness, simply lead to the
conclusion that the combined legislative authority of non-
Aboriginal Canadian governments was plenary prior to 1982.
Therefore, there was no space, prior to 1982, for Aboriginal
self-government that amounted to a co-ordinate sovereignty or
third order of constitutional government. But that is a far cry
from saying that Aboriginal governmental traditions and
practices ceased to exist and thus are not constitutionally
protected after 1982 by section 35.
In other words, the most that can be said, following
Dicey, is that the colonial government of B.C. prior to 1871,
and the federal government from 1871 to 1982, had the power
or capacity to unilaterally extinguish all vestiges of Aboriginal
self-government. But the mere existence of this capacity is not
proof of its exercise. With respect, the majority judges in
Delgamuukw confuse the capacity to extinguish with actual
extinguishment in fact. As a result, they left aside the potential
of section 35 to create a constitutional guarantee of jurisdiction
where none existed before.38
Following the Sparrow decision, even detailed regulation
of the self-governing practices and traditions of the Gitksan
and Wet'suwet'en peoples would not amount to extinguish-
ment of their Aboriginal right of self-government. Yet as
Hutcheon J.A. noted in dissent, the self-governing practices of
the plaintiffs could not have been extinguished prior to 1871,
because the penetration of European society in the territory
had barely commenced.39 After 1871, B.C. lacked the
jurisdiction to pass laws having the intent or effect of
extinguishing Aboriginal rights. In the dissenters' view,
federal legislation passed after 1871, including successive
Indian Acts, heavily regulated the right of self-government,
but did not amount to a clear and plain blanket
extinguishment.' °
There are persuasive reasons for preferring the dissenting
position in Delgamuukw that the plaintiffs' Aboriginal rights of
self-government were not extinguished prior to 1982, and thus
are existing rights recognized and affirmed by section 35. On
this view, even if Aboriginal self-government rights fell short
of constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy or jurisdiction prior to
1982, this is no longer the case. The exercise of the right of
self-government is protected from any government interference
that cannot meet the strict justificatory standard set out by the
Supreme Court in Sparrow.
0OMOLUSIOM
Together with the change in provincial government policy
signalled by the establishment of the B.C. Treaty Commission,
the Court of Appeal judgment in Delgamuukw brings an end
to the era of official denial of the existence of Aboriginal title
in B.C.. Nevertheless, in other respects, the majority
decisions are open to many of the same objections that critics
have levelled at the McEachern judgment. I have focussed
here on the failure of the majority to apply the same rigour to
the question of extinguishment of Aboriginal self-government
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as they did to their analysis of the extinguishment of
Aboriginal title.
Given the position taken by the majority judges, their
statements wishing the parties success in resolving their
differences through negotiation ring rather hollow in so far as
self-government is concerned. To understate the obvious,
blanket extinguishment places Aboriginal Peoples in an
unenviable bargaining position. In their defence, the judges
insisted that the role of the court was to state the law rather
than to facilitate a just settlement through negotiations.41 Yet
this insistence on marking clear boundaries between law and
politics is futile and compromises the ability of section 35
jurisprudence to achieve its remedial promise of a just
settlement for Aboriginal Peoples. A glance at the history of
relations between Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian state
reveals that the content of legal doctrine and the outcome of
negotiations have moved together in a close dialectical
relationship. Legal decisions have played and will continue to
play a crucial role in setting the parameters of negotiations
and shaping the realm of the possible for Aboriginal
Peoples. 0
Bruce Ryder
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
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